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This paper highlights the role of hatred and its evolution in determining the nature of 
peace between groups, or nations, after reaching, and while implementing, truce. It 
proposes that weak inertia, diminishing memory of hatred and low propensity to 
reciprocate hatred are essential for reaching a genuine and stable peace. In the case of 
mutual abstinence from violence, genuine peace process prevails if both groups have 
sufficiently weak inertia and strongly diminishing memories of hatred and low 
propensities to reciprocate hatred. When these conditions are not satisfied, genuine 
peace may still be reached if one of the groups has weak inertia and strongly 
diminishing memory of hatred. Strong inertia, persistent memories of hatred and high 
propensities to reciprocate hatred are obstacles for reaching genuine and stable peace 
between groups and nations.  
 





   In many regions and countries the population is divided by factors such as origin, 
culture, religion and race into rival nations, or groups. Conflicts between these 
nations, or groups, constitute a major aspect of their coexistence. The literature on 
conflicts between nations (external conflicts) stresses political and economic factors 
that may influence the likelihood of wars. For instance, Grafinkel [8] has studied the 
interactions between domestic politics and international conflicts and argued that 
political party competition associated with electoral uncertainty leads to a decline in 
military spending, and that democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible 
“pre-commitment” mechanism that moderates conflict between nations. Hess and 
Orphaniedes [11] have disputed the idea that democracy and democratic institutions  
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moderate conflicts and frequency of wars between nations. Bearce and Fisher [1] and 
Dorussen [5] have argued that there is an inverse relationship between trade and war. 
Nafziger and Auvinen [12] have shown that income inequality and pervasive rent-
seeking by ruling elite are linked to war. Hess and Orphanides [10] have stressed the 
role of recessions in triggering external conflicts. The literature on violent conflicts 
between groups (internal conflicts) has emphasized the roles of political-economic 
factors, ideology, ethnicity and religion. For example, Blomberg and Hess [2] have 
argued that recession combined with external conflict increases the probability of 
internal conflict. Collier and Hoeffler [3] [4] have argued that civil wars are motivated 
either by greed for private gains or by grievance stemming from autocracy, ethnic and 
religious differences, and poor economic performance. Elbadawi and Sambanis [6] 
have found that democracy is negatively associated with civil violence and that the 
prevalence of civil war is positively associated with ethnic fragmentation. Reynal-
Querol [13] have concluded that religious differences constitute a social cleavage that 
is more important than linguistic differences in the development of civil wars and that 
democracy significantly reduces the incidence of civil wars between ethnic groups.  
   Despite differences and rivalry, abstinence from violence, and even cooperation, are 
possible outcomes of a conflict. Skaperdas [14] has demonstrated that there is a 
possibility of cooperation between rival groups when the probabilities of winning an 
armed conflict are significantly different and when the groups’ marginal contributions 
to useful production are similar. Grossman and Kim [9] have analyzed a general 
equilibrium model of resource allocation to appropriation and productive activities 
and highlighted a non-aggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to 
offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secured. 
   This paper argues that cessation of violence is a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient one, for reaching a stable, genuine peace between rival groups, or nations. It 
highlights the role of hatred and its persistence, or dissolution, in shaping the nature of 
peace between groups. In addition to formal agreements, genuine and stable peace 
requires the dissolution of hatred between groups. In particular, the paper attempts to 
identify the conditions for convergence to a stable and genuine peace between two 
groups following a cessation of violence. The co-evolution of hatred between two 
groups, or nations, is parsimoniously presented by a system of two differential 
equations. A similar approach has been used by Faria [7] to describe the possible 
mutual evolution of the rival populations of Neanderthals and modern Homo Sapiens. 
The inherent nature of the peace between the groups is diagnosed by identifying the 
asymptotic properties of the system’s steady state. The analysis suggests that strong 
inertia, persistent memories of hatred and high propensities to reciprocate hatred 
prevent rival groups from reaching a genuine and stable peace. 
 
2. Formulation of hatred evolution and genuine peace process 
 
   Consider a situation where two groups, or nations, A and B, do not trust one another 
and are engaged in a violent conflict. The evolution of A’s hatred of B (denoted 
by AH  with negative values representing A’s level of affection of B) and the 
evolution of B’s hatred of A (denoted by BH  with negative values representing B’s 
level of affection of A) are displayed by a differential equation system which, for 
simplicity, is taken to be first order and linear: 
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In this system, t is a continuous time index,1 AtV  is the intensity of A’s violence 
against B at t, BtV  is the intensity of B’s violence against A at t, 1β  and 2β  are 
parameters reflecting the effects of each group’s violence on the evolution of its 
counterpart’s hatred, and 11α , 12α , 21α , and 22α  are the elements of the equation-
system’s state-transition matrix.2  
   The parameters 11α  and 22α  reflect the effects of the current hatred level of each 
group on the evolution of its hatred of the counterpart. The sign and size of each of 
these parameters depend on two opposite factors associated with the current level of 
this destructive mental state. One factor is the group’s collective habitual propensity 
to hate its counterpart—inertia. The other is the group’s instantaneous weakening of 
this mental state that is caused by a fading collective memory of hatred of the 
opponent. Hence, 11α  and 22α  are, positive if the respective group’s hatred-inertia 
dominates the group’s diminishing memory of hatred of its counterpart. They are 
zero, or even negative, otherwise. In many instances, physical factors (such as 
disputed territories and natural resources) and cultural and religion differences serve 
as permanent reminders.  
   The parameter 12α  indicates the effect of group B’s level of hatred of group A on 
the evolution of group A’s hatred of group B. Similarly, 21α  indicates the effect of 
group A’s level of hatred of group B on the evolution of group B’s hatred of group A. 
That is, 12α  reflects the collective propensity of the people of group A to reciprocate 
hatred toward group B and 21α  reflects the collective propensity of the people of 
group B to reciprocate hatred toward group A. These parameters are inversely related 
to the groups’ ability to behave compassionately.  
   In this formulation, a genuine peace process is defined as a course of affair between 
group A and group B that is free of violence ( BA VV == 0 ) and reflecting a trend of 
diminishing mutual hatred from the initial positive levels ( 0, 00 >
BA HH ). Cessation of 
violence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for having a genuine peace 
process. That is, although the steady state (SS) of the differential equation-system (1) 
and (2) associated with BA VV == 0  is free of hatred ( Bss
A
ss HH == 0 ), there is not 
necessarily convergence to this steady state. The nature of the A-B peace process is 
identified by the characteristic roots of the state-transition matrix of the homogeneous 
part of the aforementioned linear differential equation system: 
 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, time can be taken to be discrete and the evolution of hatred can be depicted by a system 
of difference equations. 
2 By subtracting from the right-hand-sides of equation (1) and equation (2) factors representing the 
stationary effect of economically, culturally and politically positive exchanges between the two groups, 
the system can be broadened to generate a steady state with mutual affection ( 0, <Bss
A
ss HH ). 
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When these characteristic roots are negative, or conjugate complex pair with a 
negative real part, the hatred-free steady state, Bss
A
ss HH == 0 , is asymptotically 
stable. That is, cessation of violence starts a genuine peace process between group A 





   When A and B mutually abstain from violence, genuine peace process prevails if: 
i. A and B have sufficiently weak inertia and strongly diminishing 
memories of hatred so that 0, 2211 <αα , and 
ii. A’s and B’s propensities to reciprocate hatred ( 0, 2112 ≥αα ) are 
sufficiently low so that 21122211 αααα > . 
Conditions i and ii ensure that the characteristic roots are either negative or 
constituting a conjugate complex pair with a negative real part. In the first case, the 
hatred-free steady state is a proper node. In the second case, the hatred-free steady 
state is approachable along a spiralling path. When the groups’ propensities to 
reciprocate aversion are such that 22112112
2
22112211 )(25.0 αααααααα <<+− , there 
is convergence to the hatred-free steady state between A and B from any initial level 
of mutual hatred. If the groups’ propensities to reciprocate aversion are sufficiently 
low so that 2221122112112 )(25.0 αααααα +−<  (i.e., 0<Δ ), the convergence to the 
hatred-free steady between A and B from any initial level of mutual hatred is along a 
bumpy road—an oscillating path displaying periods of mutual hatred, one-sided 
hatred, and mutual affection.  
 
   When conditions i and ii are not satisfied, genuine peace can still be reached if one 
of the groups has weak inertia and strongly diminishing memory of hatred. In 
particular, there exists two stable manifolds along which the groups’ levels of hatred 
continually decrease as long as one of these groups has weak inertia and strongly 
diminishing memory of hatred so that, despite the inertia-dominated generation of 
hatred by the other group, 02211 <+αα . In this case, only one of the groups has a 
dominant, strongly diminishing collective memory (i.e., either 011 <α  and 022 >α , 
or vice versa). Recalling the assumption that 0, 2112 ≥αα , 021122211 <− αααα  and 
consequently 2211 αα +>Δ . Given that 02211 <+αα , 01 >λ  whereas 02 <λ . 
Hence the hatred-free steady state is a saddle point. That is, there exist two convergent 
arms to Bss
A
ss HH == 0  from mutual, not necessarily the initial, combinations of 
hatred.  
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